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In recent issues of this journal a debate has raged concerning the appropriate nature of 
academic research in the Asia Pacific region. In keeping with the expressed desire for 
both rigor and regional relevance in this research, we wish to demonstrate a strong 
commonality between the performance of large Asian firms and others from Europe and 
North America. The large Asian firms mostly operate on an intra-regional basis. It has 
been assumed that the path to success for Asian firms is globalization, yet we show that 
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This paper examines the regional nature of the largest Asian firms. We build on prior 
empirical work which shows how the majority of the world’s 500 largest firms have most 
of their sales in their home region (Rugman, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). Three 
sets of data are presented. The first set shows how 105 out of the 115 Asian firms (91 
percent) reporting geographic sales data are home-region oriented. Just three are truly 
global, with a significant proportion of their sales in all three parts of the triad. Second, in 
addition to sales data (which report output, or market-related measures of 
internationalization) we present data on the global distribution of the assets of these 
Asian firms. Measured by assets all but 3 of the 111 Asian firms (97 percent) in the 
world’s largest 500, for which asset data are available, are home-region oriented. The 
third set of data shows how the vast majority of peer-reviewed academic publications 
have focused on the most global and therefore unrepresentative of these firms. We saw 
that much of what we understand of Asian firms in terms of their distinctive 
characteristics: competitive strengths and weaknesses) are drawn from a biased sample of 
the most “global” firms.  
  After presenting the above data an adapted ‘Regional Matrix’ (Rugman, 1981) is 
presented as a framework for explaining the patterns of limited internationalization 
shown by the data. Case studies are then presented to supplement the data and examine 
the most unusual bi-regional, host-region oriented and global Asian firms. As other 
studies and prior research (Collinson and Rugman, 2006) has focused on the limited 
globalization of Japanese firms we focus on non-Japanese firms (BHP Billiton, Hon Hai 
Precision, Flextronics, and Hutchison Whampoa) to see if there are common  
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characteristics driving their unusual levels of regionalization. Finally, considering the 
additional data we have compiled on case study selection in peer reviewed management 
and business journals, we comment on the implications of the biases in research on Asian 
firms. 
 
THE DATA SHOW: ASIAN BUSINESS IS REGIONAL, NOT GLOBAL 
Empirical data increasingly support a regional perspective, countering the dominant view 
of globalization. Of the 380 firms with regional sales data examined by Rugman (2005), 
the North American firms average 77.2 percent of their sales in their home region, the 
Europeans average 62.8 percent, and the Asian firms average 74.3 percent. Each region 
has three truly global firms, while North America has 167 home-region oriented firms, 
Europe has 86, and Asia has 66. Despite being large and multinational the activities of, 
and influences on, these firms are strongly localized. Rather than increasingly 
homogenized markets (Levitt, 1983) and a ubiquitous need for global strategies (Yip, 
2002) we have at most a situation of semi-globalization (Ghemawat, 2001, 2003). 
Regional issues arguably provide better explanations of what influences these firms’ 
strategies and performance than global issues. 
  Here we add to the above empirical evidence using an alternative but well-
recognized listing of the world’s largest firms, the Top 500 (2005). This contains 122 
firms from Asia, 115 of which publish geographic sales data and 111 publish geographic 
asset data. These firms are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 here  
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  As summarized in Table 2, 105 (91 percent) of the 115 firms for which sales data 
are available are home-region oriented (shown in Table 1 as firms with a “D” in the 
column headed ‘Type’). There are three global firms: Sony, Canon, and Mazda Motor, all 
from Japan; five are bi-regionals: Toyota, Nissan, and Bridgestone from Japan, BHP 
Billiton from Australia, and Flextronics from Singapore; and two are host-region oriented 
firms:  Honda (Japan) and Hon Hai Precision Industries from Taiwan. Overall, the 115 
Asian firms from the top 500 have an average of 81.87 percent of their sales in their 
home region. Going beyond previous studies (Rugman, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 
2004), however, we can also report that, on average, 87.09 percent of the assets of these 
firms are located in their home region. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
  In Table 3 we show the firms listed in Table 1 by country, with the average 
revenues, intra-regional sales and assets for each country group. There are some 
interesting comparisons to be made, both between country groups and between the 
current and past levels of (limited) internationalization illustrated by these data. 
  Briefly, 12 large Chinese firms have the highest levels of intra-regional sales and 
assets, which is to be expected when we look at the composition of the group. Many of 
the large Chinese firms tend to be (at least partly) government owned and supported. 
They are in the energy, commodities, utilities, and telecoms sectors, where growth has 
been driven by the rising needs of the domestic market. This contrasts with the profile of 
the Japanese, South Korean, and Australian firms which have experienced a longer period  
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of growth, yet still remain oriented to the Asian region. The content of many of the 
annual reports from which the data was gathered suggests that an increased (or renewed?) 
focus on the Asia region was taking place because of the steady growth rates experienced 
in mainland China. Certainly the Japanese firms, which both dominate the list (79 firms) 
and are (on average) the largest, were shifting their focus towards China in terms of both 
inputs and outputs. This is confirmed by both FDI and trade data (Rugman, Collinson and 
Hodgetts, 2006). 
  The main, overriding message here is that very few of these firms can be thought 
of as global; they are all conducting most of their business in the Asian region. This is the 
central empirical driver of this paper; the vast majority of Asian firms are regional, not 
global.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
THE REGIONAL MATRIX AND ASIAN FIRMS 
We take the basic model of international business which distinguishes between country-
level and firm-level effects and adapt it for this analysis. In earlier work a matrix of 
country-specific advantages (CSAs) and firm-specific advantages (FSAs) was developed 
(Rugman, 1981 and Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Much of the analysis in the IB field 
can be synthesized within a simple framework of CSAs and FSAs which are the two 
basic building blocks for international business strategy. The FSAs possessed by a firm 
are based ultimately on its internalization of an asset, such as: production; knowledge; 
managerial; or marketing capabilities. The firm exercises proprietary control over these  
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FSAs, which are thus related to the firm’s ability to coordinate the use of the advantage in 
production, marketing, brands, or the customization of services.  
  Beyond the firm there are country factors. They can lead to country-specific 
advantages (CSAs) which affect a firm's strategy. For example, the CSAs can include 
political, cultural, economic, and financial factors which are parameters exogenous to the 
firm. In Porter (1990) terminology, the CSAs form the basis of the global platform from 
which the multinational firm derives a home-base “diamond” advantage in global 
competition. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and other government regulation also 
influence CSAs.  
  This two-by-two FSA/CSA matrix can be modified into the regional matrix, as 
shown in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis is shown the regional or global reach of the 
FSAs of a firm. On the vertical axis is shown the regional or global scope of the 
locational advantages of a firm’s FSAs. The vertical axis becomes operational for 
strategy as, for each firm there are data available on geographic scope. The regional 
matrix differs from the CSA/FSA matrix in that both axes represent FSA aspects of 
corporate strategy. 
Figure 1 here 
 
  We have positioned our 115 Asian firms from the top 500 inside the regional 
matrix. Almost all of these 115 firms are on the lower (regional) half of the vertical axis. 
Only three are unambiguously "global" in their geographic scope. The three bi-regional 
firms are also constrained in their geographic scope to the regional half of the vertical 
axis. This new regional matrix leads us to the following key analytical classifications:-  
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Cell 3:  Global firms—these have a global reach of their FSAs and a global scope 
for FSAs; they are in all three regions of the triad; we find three among our 75 
Asian firms; 
Cell 4:  Bi-regional firms—these have a global reach for their FSAs, but they are 
not global in their geographic scope, as they only have a significant presence in 
two regions of the triad; again there are just three in our list of 75 Asian firms; 
host region firms also appear here, such as News Corp and Honda. 
Cell 2:  Home-region firms—these have FSAs with a reach only in their home 
region, and they also have home-region locational FSAs; 66 of the 75 Asian firms 
fit into this category. 
Cell 1:  Firms with home-region FSAs but a global scope in FSAs—there are very 
few of these in practice, although many firms think that they are global in scope; 
data show, however, that they are actually home-region based, in cell 2. We call 
cell 1, the "myth" of global scope. 
 
ASIAN FIRM CASE STUDIES 
We now apply the framework of Figure 1 to analyze some specific firms in each of the 
major cells. This will help us to classify the differences between regional and global 
structures and strategies of the world's largest Asian firms. 
  These cases will show how the former set of firms above is relatively unique in 
managing to develop FSAs applicable to other triad markets. Literature helps provide the 
beginnings of an explanation of why most firms are home-region based in their FSAs. 
First we develop an analytical framework to position these case studies.  
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  When we examine the unusual, more international Asian firms we can find 
specific reasons as to why they have internationalized to the degree they have. As listed 
in Table 1, when we measure them in terms of sales, or downstream FSAs in Figure 2, 
there are: 5 bi-regional firms (Toyota, Nissan, BHP Billiton, Bridgestone, and 
Flextronics), two host-region oriented firms (Honda and Hon Hai Precision Industries) 
and three global firms (Sony, Canon, and Mazda). In terms of assets, or upstream FSAs 
there is just one bi-regional firm (Hutchison Whampoa), one host-region oriented firm 
(Honda) and one global firm (Flextronics). 
  Of course, there are industry sector effects that need to be considered in 
explaining the differences across the above sample of firms. Steel and bulk chemicals, 
simply because of transportation costs, are less internationalized industries. But this is 
another factor promoting regionalization rather than globalization. 
  In past studies we have focused on Japanese firms which dominate lists of the 
largest Asian firms (Collinson and Rugman , 2006; Rugman and Collinson, 2004). In this 
paper we will briefly examine how the other Asian firms in the above list (BHP Billiton, 
Hon Hai Precision Industries, Hutchinson Whampoa and Flextronics) are different from 
the more representative home-region oriented Asian firms. 
 
BHP Billiton 
Many of the more international firms in our list have expanded geographically via 
mergers-and-acquisitions (M&As). BHP Billiton is a case in point. Formed by the merger 
in 2001 of BHP (Australia) and Billiton (UK) it now employs 37,000 people working in 
more than 100 operations in approximately 25 countries (http://www.bhpbilliton.com/)  
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Billiton was originally Dutch, and for some time was part of Royal Dutch Shell before a 
separate listing on the London Stock Exchange. The firm is now a leading supplier of 
core steelmaking raw materials and in the top-five producers of copper, energy coal, 
nickel metal, and uranium. The merger represents a combination of two firms 
representing very different combinations of CSAs and FSAs. Billiton was an EU-based 
raw materials producer which expanded historically by establishing mining activities in 
Dutch and British colonial territories. It leveraged other countries’ advantages and built 
sales channels in the growing European markets. BHP’s growth was based on the CSAs 
of Australia, developing mining and processing operations initially to serve the domestic 
and regional markets.  
  The geographic distribution of sales and assets today reflects this history. Less 
than four percent of BHP Billiton’s assets are in Europe, over half remain in the Asia 
region and predominantly in Australia. In terms of assets distribution it is a home-region 
oriented firm. Just over 33 percent of the firm’s sales are in Europe. Add to this the 47 
percent in its home region gives us a bi-regional firm in terms of sales, because of the 
above merger. 
 
Hon Hai Precision Industries (Foxconn) 
Hon Hai Precision Industries is described as the ‘probably the biggest company you have 
never heard of’ (http://www.hoovers.com). It is better known as ‘Foxconn’ and last year 
surpassed Flextronics to become the world's largest contract manufacturer for computer 
parts, mainly connectors and cable assemblies. The firm began manufacturing plastic 
products in the early 1970s but grew rapidly in the 1990s on the back of steep demand for  
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cheap IT components (http://www.foxconn.com/) and the move by firms such as HP and 
Apple to bring down costs and contract out their assembly operations (Dean, 2003). Its 
market value stands at over $17 billion (up from less than $2 billion in 2002). Although 
the firm does not publish details of the geographic distribution of its assets we can be 
fairly sure that most of its assets are located in the Asian region. Despite establishing 
some manufacturing in Europe (Scotland and Ireland) and the US (Los Angeles, Houston, 
and Kansas City) its main production operations are based in Taiwan and mainland China 
(in Guangdong and Jiangsu Provinces). Hon Hai Precision Industries has effectively built 
on its CSAs, notably cheap labour, and tapped into a growing global market for IT 
hardware during a period of rapidly increased sales and declining prices (post-2000). 
Over 55 percent of its total sales are in North America making it a host-oriented firm in 
terms of downstream FSAs. It could be argued that the success of the firm and its 
particular form of international expansion has been driven more by the outsourcing 
strategies of Western electronics hardware brand-owners than by the firms own FSA 
development (Ernst, 2000). 
 
Flextronics 
Flextronics and similar firms like Solectron, Sanmina-SCI, Celestica, and Jabil make the 
Microsoft Xbox, Web TV set-top boxes for Phillips and Sony; portable phones for 
Ericsson, Alcatel, and Motorola; and PCs for a range of Western firms. But Flextronics is 
by far the largest of these contract manufacturers. With 48 percent of its sales in Asia, 35 
percent in Europe, and 17 percent in the Americas it is a bi-regional firm in terms of its 
downstream FSAs. In terms of its asset distribution Flextronics is global; 47 percent in  
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Asia, 28 percent in Europe, and 25 percent in the Americas. It is the only firm with this 
distinction in our entire list 111 firms (those from the 122 Asian firms in the top 500 for 
which asset data were available). Its stages of growth since its beginnings in Singapore in 
1990 give us some insights into this unusual pattern of internationalization.  
  Like Hon Hai Precision Industries above it could be argued that Flextronics has 
evolved on the back of a major transformation in the structure global production 
networks, that of vertical specialization (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard, 2000). Global brand 
owners and OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) have increasingly outsourced 
manufacturing and related services to global contract manufacturers, like Flextronics. 
Unlike Hon Hai, Precision Industries Flextronics has expanded rapidly by purchasing 
smaller electronics industry contractors and factories from its customers. In 2000 it 
purchased a Japanese factory from Casio and was contracted to manufacture for the 
Japanese firm as it restructured to ‘externalize’ its production activities. In 2001 it bought 
half of Xerox’s office equipment-making operations for $220 million and took on a five-
year outsourcing contract to manufacture Xerox products (Rugman, Collinson and 
Hodgetts, 2006); http://www.flextronics.com/). In the same year it took over much of 
Ericsson’s manufacturing and supply chain activities in Brazil, Malaysia, Sweden, and 
the UK. Ericsson decided to focus on high-end R&D and design activities and let other 
firms manufacture telecoms system components (UNCTAD, WIR, 2003 pg.139). 
  Through this route Flextronics has acquired and developed six industrial parks in 
low-cost regions near each large triad market. In Asia, two industrial parks in China and a 
network of regional manufacturing facilities supply printers, cell phones, telephone 
switching boards, and PDAs, among other products. In the Americas, products from its  
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two industrial parks (one in Mexico, one in Brazil) and its network of manufacturing 
facilities include automotive, telecommunications, networking equipment, and hardware 
products, among others. Eastern Europe, Poland, and Hungary host two industrial parks 
that are also supported by nearby manufacturing facilities and that produce 
telecommunications infrastructure, electronics for automotives, printers, and disposable 
cameras, among others. 
  The strategy of buying-out the manufacturing operations of telecoms and IT firms 
continues, most recently with the purchase of Nortel’s manufacturing operations in 
Calgary, Canada, including the transfer of 650 employees. But Flextronics is also aiming 
to improve its innovative capabilities in R&D and design and move higher up the 
industry value chain. By doing so it will begin to challenge some of its own client 
companies; the same firms that now outsource their manufacturing operations to 
specialize in these higher-end capabilities (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005). 
 
Hutchison Whampoa  
This Asian conglomerate began in the 1860s as a Hong-Kong trading company. It now 
encompasses container ports, property development, telecommunications, and retailing; it 
was founded by, and is still controlled by, its founder the influential businessman, Li Ka-
Shing. Retailing dominates in terms of revenue, followed by telecoms, which has grown 
rapidly with the firm’s investment into the 3G platform in Europe (Lim, 2005). 
  Hutchison Whampoa’s international expansion increased noticeably in the late 
1980s when it took over Canada's Husky Oil, partnered with Procter & Gamble in 
personal care and retailing and entered the UK telecoms business. In the 1990s it  
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expanded rapidly in four distinct business areas: (1) telecoms and satellite TV, through 
partnerships with Cable & Wireless and CITIC and by launching ‘Orange’ in the UK in 
1994 (bought by Mannesmann AG for $14.6 billion in 1999); (2) ports and port 
infrastructure, acquiring the Port of Felixstowe in Britain in 1991 and developing 
terminal services around Asia; (3) energy and utilities; (4) retailing and personal care 
products through its A.S. Watson group. 
  The firm has continued to expand in these same four areas throughout this decade. 
In 2000 it won the largest 3G license 'A' in the United Kingdom for over $6 billion. The 
platform was expanded to European countries and then to other parts of the World, 
primarily Asia. In Japan this was via partnerships with NEC and NTT in 2002. By 2005 
when a deal was struck with Skype the Group's 3G global customer base had reached 
over 10 million. As a key license-holder in telecoms Hutchison Whampoa is now seen as 
a ‘flagship firm’ alongside Vodafone, coordinating a wide array of hardware and 
software suppliers and service content providers (Whalley, 2004). 
  The ports business has also grown rapidly on the back of huge expansion in China 
and India, but it has also acquired interests in Turkey, Egypt and Poland. Husky energy 
now spans the globe from Canada to Asia, with large deals recently in the UK and China. 
A.S. Watson retail has also continued to grow. The year 2004 saw particularly strong 
developments in Eastern Europe, and by 2005 A.S. Watson was seen as the world’s 
‘largest health and beauty chain’. 
    This pattern of diversified expansion, with a strong focus on UK and European 
ports, telecoms, and utilities investments explains the asset and sales distribution for 
Hutchison Whampoa. It has 63 percent of its assets outside the Asia region and 44  
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percent in Europe making it bi-regional in terms of its asset distribution; 34 percent of its 
sales are also in Europe but because over 50 percent are in the Asia region it is classified 
as a home-region oriented firm in sales terms. 
 
The Problems of Biased ‘Globalization’ Research in Asia 
The widespread view among the international business research community that large 
firms are more global in their business activities than they actually are has led to 
inaccurate views about the nature and extent of globalization. With hindsight we can see 
that biased research, focusing on the most “global” of firms rather than the most 
representative firms, has contributed to this inaccuracy.  
  The following discussion extends an argument put forward by Lynn (2006) and 
other authors in a recent special issue of the Journal of Asian Business and Management. 
They point to the inappropriateness of many of the theoretical approaches developed in 
the West for analyzing Asian business practices. However, they miss the related point 
that most of the published empirical research, by focusing predominantly on the more 
international Asian firms, is also part of the bias problem.  
  Similarly, a number of reflexive papers in a recent volume (23) of the Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management discuss approaches to studying the distinctiveness of Asian 
business and management, but miss the empirical sample bias we show below. Our 
findings add weight to the main points of Meyer’s insightful article calling for greater 
‘self-confidence’ in studies of Asian business and management (Meyer, 2006). Despite 
helpful guidance on appropriate methodological approaches, including qualitative  
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methodologies, Meyer’s article also neglects the case-study selection bias which supports 
his overall argument about a US-centric approach to management studies. 
  We present our evidence in Table 4. This shows that the more “global” Asian 
firms dominate academic research across all business and management disciplines in 
peer-reviewed journals. Using a simple bibliometric technique we show that there is a 
strong correlation between the degree of globalization of a firm and the attention paid to 
it in academic research. Our measure of the latter is a simple ‘hit’ count using the name 
of the firm as a keyword when searching a leading database of peer-reviewed journals in 
management and business studies. None of the top five firms in this list (Table 4) are the 
usual home-region oriented type of Asian multinational, yet these five unrepresentative 
firms account for over half of the total number of articles for the entire group of 75. There 
is an overwhelming bias in management studies towards firms like Toyota, Sony, Canon, 
and Honda because of their impact in the global economy (particularly in the United 
States). Yet they do not provide us with examples of what really differentiates Japanese 
or Asian firms from other firms. We know least about the most ‘typical’ group of Asian 
firms whose sales are predominantly in their home region.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
  There are parallels between past research on Japanese firms and the newer 
research on firms from emerging markets in Asia, including China. This is linked to the 
current concern about the evolving global competitiveness of large Asian firms, which 
has strong similarities with the fear of Japanese economic superiority among US and  
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European CEOs and policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s. The perceived threat from 
Japan stemmed from the rapid relative growth in GDP, exports, and outward FDI which 
suggested that an alternative model of market capitalism had given rise to specific 
competitive advantages that Western firms could not access. (See Collinson and Rugman, 
2006, for a more complete review of the related literatures).  
  With hindsight we can see that even the more rigorous comparative studies of 
Japanese firms tended to focus only on a small sub-set of the most international firms in 
the relatively few industry sectors experiencing export-led growth (Pearce and 
Papanastassiou, 1996; Fransman, 1995; Dunning and Cantwell, 1991). They also tended 
to focus on specific, superior capabilities achieved by these Japanese firms in a limited 
range of business processes.  
  What we now know is that relatively few Japanese firms have ever managed to 
internationalize across the triad. The vast majority of Japanese firms are still strongly 
dependent on the domestic market. This bias, toward the more unusual, more 
international Japanese firms, has given rise to a number of related problems, which we 
can learn from in guiding current research on Asian business and management. Past 
studies promoted an exaggerated perception of the competitive threat from Japan, 
suggesting that the advantages demonstrated by the relatively small number of exporters 
in autos, consumer electronics, and engineering were general Japanese advantages. A 
more objective approach would have questioned the degree to which we could generalize 
from these unusual examples. This was also linked to the expectation that the majority of 
Japanese firms would eventually internationalize to the same degree as the lead exporting 
firms in these key sectors. As our data shows, they have not.  
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  We could also argue that much of our understanding about the ‘real’ differences 
between Japanese firms and firms from other parts of the world is limited, because so 
much less is known about the more representative, home-region oriented firm. For 
example, we know less than we should about Japan as the ‘locus of origin of geographic 
diversification’ for such firms (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). 
  A small follow-up study examined the article hits for the Chinese firms in our 
larger list of 122 top 500 Asian firms. It gave the following results: 4 hits for Sinopec; 3 
for the China Construction Bank, and Shanghai Baosteel Group; 2 for China National 
Petroleum, China Life Insurance, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural 
Bank of China, and China Telecommunications; 1 for State Grid, China Mobile 
Communications, and Sinochem; and no hits for China Southern Power Grid, COFCO, 
and China First Automotive Works (FAW); (note that not all these firms are listed in 
Table 1 because data on the international distribution of their sales and assets were not 
available). 
  Hutchison Whampoa received 17 hits, however, and Chinese firms that are 
currently not in the top 500 list but are well known for their international activities and 
aspirations are also starting to attract more attention than their size warrants; Haier (14), 
Shanghai Automotive (or SAIC) (10) and Lenovo (9). 
  Mathews (2006), in an otherwise very useful addition to the literature on 
latecomer firms makes a number of the above mistakes in his discussion of ‘dragon 
multinationals.’ His data on the ‘Asia-Pacific MNEs in UNCTAD’s list of Top 50 MNEs 
from developing economies’ (Table 1; p.11) shows total overseas assets of the selected 
firms but does not show a breakdown by geographic location. Moreover, by adopting  
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UNCTAD’s ‘Trans-Nationality Index’ (TNI) the analysis misses the strong regional 
concentration of both sales and assets that our data illustrate. Finally, by presenting case 
studies of the ‘more globalized’ firms in the list, including Ispat, Cemex, Acer, Li & 
Fung, and Lenovo, the study contains the sample bias we discuss above. However, 
Mathews’ central argument focuses on the relative differences in the internationalization 
process between latecomer and incumbent MNEs, justifying this case selection. What 
should be clear is that we cannot make generalizations regarding the characteristics of the 
majority of Asian firms on the basis of analyses of this unusually international sub-group. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Figure 2 summarizes our main findings. It is based on Rugman (2005). It reports that the 
top Asian firms are distributed across the regional matrix with an intra-regional scope to 
their FSAs, based on both sales and asset data. We find that 108 out of the 111 firms with 
asset data on upstream FSAs are home-region oriented and lie in cell 2.  We also found 
that 105 of the 115 firms with sales data are in cell 1. Only three of the 108 firms with 
asset data are not home-region based. Only ten are non home-region based using sales 
data on downstream FSA. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
  Figure 2 also lists the article ‘hits’ from Table 4, representing the degree to which 
academic research has focused on each group of firms. This clearly illustrates the 
overwhelming focus in the previous literature on the rare global and bi-regional Asian  
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firms, which have been assumed to be representative of Asian companies in general. 
They are actually a few isolated special cases. Finally, the case study firms discussed in 
this paper are placed in their appropriate categories. 
The FSAs possessed by a firm, whether downstream or upstream, are ultimately 
based on its internalization of a knowledge resource or capability. This restricts its ability 
to leverage advantages away from its home region and compete successfully in other 
markets. What we demonstrate here, in the case of the Asian firms examined, is that their 
major knowledge assets and capabilities have evolved in the specific regional selection 
environment of Asia. It is highly unusual to find Asian firms like Toyota, Flextronics, 
and Sony that have managed to de-couple from the home region base of their FSAs or to 
adapt and customize to compete outside their home region. Yet such unrepresentative 
“global” firms are the overwhelming focus of the traditional international business 
strategy research discussed in this journal into the alleged differentiating characteristics 
and superior competitive advantages of Asian firms. In contrast, we find here that the vast 
majority of Asian firms have evolved FSAs to succeed in the regional Asian home 
market. They are unlikely to substantially expand their sales or foreign assets into other 
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The Asian firms in the Top 500 
 





Country   Country 
Rank 





regional  Type  F/T 
Sales 
%Intra-
regional  Type 
Toyota  Motor  7  Japan  1 172,616.30 59  41  B 54  53  D 
NTT  18  Japan  2  100,545.30 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Hitachi  23  Japan  3  83,993.90 35  80  D 23  92  D 
Matsushita Electric Ind.  25  Japan  4  81,077.70  54  68  D  20  93  D 
Honda  Motor  27  Japan  5 80,486.60  80  30 S  69  36 S 
Nissan  Motor  29  Japan  6  79,799.60 66  35  B 48  60  D 
Sinopec  31  China  1  75,076.70 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
State  Grid  40  China  2  71,290.20 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Sony  47  Japan  7  66,618.00 70  30  G 50  75  D 
Nippon Life Insurance  56  Japan  8  60,520.80  <10  >90  D  12  88  D 
Toshiba  72  Japan  9  54,303.50 39  76  D 19  93  D 
Tokyo  Electric  Power  90  Japan  10  46,962.70 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Hyundai  Motor  92  S.Korea  2  46,358.20 42  63  D 11  >90  D 
NEC  96  Japan  11  45,175.50 21  79  D 15  95  D 
Dai-ichi  Mutual  Ins.  98  Japan  12  44,468.80 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Fujitsu  99  Japan  13  44,316.00 24  76  D 38  68  D 
AEON 112  Japan  14  38,943.60  <10  >90  D  11  89  D 
Meiji Yasuda Life Ins.   113  Japan  15  38,835.10  <10  >90  D  12  88  D 
LG Electronics  115  S.Korea  3  37,757.50  77  51  D  NA  NA  I 
SK 117  S.Korea  4  37,691.60  53  70  D  NA  NA  I 
Petronas  133  Malaysia  1  36,064.80 77  60  D 23  81  D 
Nippon  Oil  142  Japan  16  34,150.70  2 99  D  11 93  D 
Ito-Yokado  145  Japan  17  33,631.90 36  64  D 18  83  D 
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin.  147  Japan  18  33,318.20  9  94  D  9  93  D 
Mitsui  148  Japan  19  32,805.90 41  59  D 42  73  D 
Mitsubishi  149  Japan  20  32,735.00 15  87  D 40  74  D 
Canon  154  Japan  21  32,071.50 75  27  G 50  58  D 
Mitsubishi  Electric  156  Japan  22  31,735.40 14  98  D 10  95  D 
Nippon  Steel  157  Japan  23  31,536.90 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Sumitomo Life Ins.  158  Japan  24  31,000.20  <10  >90  D  20  80  D 
Mizuho Financial Grp.  184  Japan  25  28,278.70  14  89  D  15  87  D 
Marubeni  185  Japan  26  28,273.70 32  74  D 32  77  D 
KDDI  194  Japan  27  27,170.10 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Millea  Holdings  197  Japan  28  26,978.70 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
JFE  Holdings  202  Japan  29  26,087.60 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Denso  203  Japan  30  26,052.70 44  65  D 46  71  D 
Mazda  Motor  211  Japan  31  25,081.40 60  40  G 19  83  D 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Fin.   217  Japan  32  24,457.50  40  64  D  23  80  D  
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Kansai Electric Power  219  Japan  33  24,317.70  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind.   221  Japan  34  24,106.00  12  90  D  7  94  D 
Sharp  225  Japan  35  23,632.60 49  63  D 11  95  I 
East  Japan  Railway  226  Japan  36  23,610.50 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Fuji Photo Film  227  Japan  37  23,516.40  48  52  D  28  76  D 
Coles  Myer  235  Australia  1  23,184.40 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Sanyo  Electric  237  Japan  38  23,118.80 50  77  D 27  83  D 
BHP  Billiton  241  Australia  2  22,887.00 91  47  B 53  55  D 
Bridgestone  250  Japan  39  22,350.00 65  35  B 50  62  D 
Samsung Life Ins.  251  S.Korea  5  22,347.90  <10  >90  D  12  >90  D 
Suzuki  Motor  255  Japan  40  22,010.90 52  69  D 47  68  D 
China  Telecom.  262  China  7  21,561.80 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
UFJ  Holdings  264  Japan  42  21,450.80  7 95  D  10 93  D 
National Australia Bank  269  Australia  3  21,313.90  32  62  D  40  72  D 
POSCO  276  S.Korea  6  20,929.10  30 >90  D  <10 >90  D 
Korea  Electric  Power  277 S.Korea  7  20,914.20 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Sinochem 287  China  8  20,380.70  10  90  D  <10  >90  D 
Mitsubishi  Chemical  288  Japan  44  20,372.30 15  94  D 14  94  D 
Woolworths  289  Australia  4  20,334.50 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Chubu  Electric  Power  300  Japan  45  19,849.00 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Japan  Airlines  301  Japan  46  19,817.80 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Mitsubishi  Motors  304  Japan  47  19,750.40 38  69  D 51  82  D 
Shanghai Baosteel Grp.   309  China  9  19,543.30  11  89  D  <10  >90  D 
Sumitomo  313  Japan  48  19,068.10 42  65  D 22  81  D 
China Construction  Bk  315  China  10  19,047.90  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
China Southern Power   316  China  11  18,928.80  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Nippon  Mining  Hldings 318  Japan  49  18,817.00  <10 >90  D  <10 >90  D 
Mitsui Sumitomo Ins.   319  Japan  50  18,813.30  4  96  D  <10  >90  D 
Japan  Tobacco  320  Japan  51  18,739.00 15  85  D 32  69  D 
Itochu  327  Japan  52  18,527.90 21  92  D 12  86  D 
Japan  Post  337  Japan  53  18,006.40 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Bank Of China  339  China  12  17,960.40  25  >90  D  22  >90  D 
Sompo Japan Ins.  344  Japan  54  17,677.10  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Hutchison  Whampoa  347  China  13  17,280.80 74  53  D 80  37  B 
Daiei  353  Japan  55  17,020.50 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Aisin  Seiki  354  Japan  56  17,018.90 24  79  D 20  84  D 
Ricoh  356  Japan  57  16,879.70 49  51  D 29  73  D 
Nippon  Express  368  Japan  58  16,314.00 17  83  D 29  81  D 
Hon Hai Precision Ind.  371  Taiwan  1  16,239.50  >90  17  S  NA  NA  I 
Sumitomo Electric Ind.  372  Japan  59  16,192.00  23  84  D  17  91  D 
PTT  373  Thailand  1  16,023.30 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Flextronics  Internatnl. 375  Singapore  1  15,908.20  >90 48  B  90 47  G 
Taisei  377  Japan  60  15,892.00 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Kajima  384  Japan  61  15,700.60 10  92  D 10  92  D 
Mediceo  Holdings  390  Japan  62  15,499.90 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Hanwha  393  S.Korea  8  15,406.30 NA  >90  D NA  >90  D 
Cosmo Oil  396  Japan  63  15,296.50  2  98  D  <10  >90  D 
Agric. Bank of China  397  China  14  15,284.60  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D  
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Telstra 401  Australia  5  15,193.10  <10  >90  D  12  88  D 
Chinese  Petroleum  402 Taiwan  2  15,189.50 NA  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Cmnwlth Bk of Austral.  406  Australia  6  15,083.90  19  >90  D  17  >90  D 
Tohoku Electric Power  409  Japan  64  14,994.20  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Nippon Yusen  410  Japan  65  14,944.30  24  81  D  <10  >90  D 
KT  414 S.Korea  9  14,901.10 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
AMP  422  Australia  7  14,600.80 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
COFCO  434  China  15  14,189.40  <10 >90  D  19 >90  D 
Samsung  442  S.Korea  10  13,919.20  45 >90  D  NA >90  D 
Isuzu  Motors  444  Japan  66  13,897.20 32  83  D 13  94  D 
SK  Networks  446  S.Korea  11  13,844.30  36 >90  D  <10 >90  D 
China  (FAW)  Autom.  448  China  16  13,825.40  <10 >90  D  19 >90  D 
Shimizu 450  Japan  67  13,811.20  7  93  D  <10  >90  D 
Seiko  Epson  453  Japan  68  13,768.60 51  76  D 28  87  D 
Asahi  Glass  456  Japan  69  13,647.80 51  68  D 56  69  D 
Fuji Heavy Industries  461  Japan  70  13,459.20  43  57  D  22  78  D 
Kobe  Steel  462  Japan  71  13,433.80  25 >90  D  <10 >90  D 
Komatsu  464  Japan  72  13,350.30 46  67  D 36  72  D 
Dai Nippon Printing  467  Japan  73  13,258.60  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Toppan  Printing  471  Japan  74  13,152.90 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Central Japan Railway  472  Japan  75  13,114.90  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Kyushu Electric Power  473  Japan  76  13,107.80  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Obayashi  475  Japan  77  13,069.70 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Westpac  Banking  477  Australia  8  12,943.30 18  >90  D 19  >90  D 
Asahi  Kasei  483  Japan  78  12,819.00  20 >90  D  <10 >90  D 
Sekisui  House  486  Japan  79  12,719.50 <10  >90  D <10  >90  D 
Daiwa House Industry  487  Japan  80  12,709.40  <10  >90  D  <10  >90  D 
Australia & N.Z. Bankg  490  Australia  9  12,618.40  27  >90  D  27  >90  D 
Yamaha  Motor  496  Japan  81  12,471.50 60  58  D 45  68  D 
 
Notes:  
Data are from the most recent annual report available (2004 in most cases) 
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Asian Firms in the Top 500 by country 









Australia 9  17,573.26 86.00 87.22 
China 12  27,030.83 90.58 90.17 
Japan 79  29,735.77 80.63 86.00 
South Korea  8  24,406.94 84.90 95.00 
Others   5  19,885.06 63.00 79.50 
 




The 75 Asian firms ranked by the frequency with which they feature in academic articles 
Data for selected groups:
Article 500  Revenues  Asia Pacific
hits*  Rank Company Country  in bn US$  % of total C
91 10 Toyota Motor Japan 120.8 49.2 B
51 37 Sony Japan 60.6 32.8 G
45 190 Canon Japan 23.9 28.5 G
40 41 Honda Motor Japan 58.9 26.9 S
36 58 Nissan Motor Japan 49.6 49.7 B 263 51% 52.6 62.8 37.4
26 12 Mitsubishi Japan 105.8 86.8 D
26 84 NEC Japan 40.8 79.6 D
20 77 Toshiba Japan 43.1 75.3 D
20 251 Fuji Photo Film Japan 19.2 48.4 I 355 69% 39.4 58.1 53.0
18 32 Hitachi Japan 63.9 80 D
16 45 Matsushita Electric Industrial Japan 55 64.9 D
13 88 Fujitsu Japan 40 71.8 D
9 13 Mitsui Japan 101.2 78.9 D
9 381 Suzuki Motor Japan 13.3 68.4 D
8 23 Sumitomo Japan 77.1 87.3 D
8 141 Mitsubishi Electric  Japan 29.2 83.1 D
8 285 Bridgestone Japan 17.6 38.8 B
5 133 Hyundai Motor South Korea 30.9 81.6 D
5 219 Hyundai South Korea 21.7 56.3 D
5 379 Ricoh Japan 13.4 60.5 D
5 411 Telstra (q) Australia 12.4 92.6 D
5 442 Woolworths Australia 11.5 100 D 469 91% 8.8 37.5 74.2
4 296 Mazda Motor Japan 16.8 65.7 D
3 82 Mizuho Holdings  Japan  41.5 74.4 D
3 171 Mitsubishi Motors Japan 25.6 62.8 D
3 252 Denso Japan 19.2 73.1 D
3 364 News Corp. Australia 13.8 9 S
2 229 Nippon Steel Japan 20.6 82.2 D
2 293 Sanyo Electric Japan 16.9 72.7 D
2 348 Dentsu Japan 14.3 95 D
2 368 Japan Telecom Japan 13.6 91 D
2 378 Taisei Japan 13.4 91 D
2 388 Flextronics International Singapore 13.1 22.4 G
2 399 Japan Airlines Japan 12.9 91 D
2 404 Isuzu Motors Japan 12.8 69.2 D
2 445 Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. (q) Japan 11.3 100 D
2 499 Asahi Glass Japan 10.1 74.5 D 505 97% 2.4 17.1 71.6
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 NOTES FOR TABLE 4 
 
Firm data is from 2001 (Rugman, 2005). 
*Article ‘hits’ refers to the number of search 'hits' that were returned from a keyword search 
combining the name of the firm and the term 'business'. Only peer-reviewed periodicals were 
included in the search which used the 'Business Source Premier' database.  
 
  Quoting the database providers, “Business Source Premier is described as 'the world’s 
largest full text business database'. It provides full text for nearly 3,800 scholarly business 
journals, including full text for more than 1,100 peer-reviewed business publications. Coverage 
includes virtually all subject areas related to business. This database provides full text (PDF) for 
more than 350 of the top scholarly journals dating as far back as 1922. This database is updated 
on a daily basis via EBSCOhost”. By comparison the Social Sciences Citation Index covers 1,725 
journals spanning 50 disciplines. 
  Table 4 lists the firms ranked in order of the number of article ‘hits’ received. The final 
list includes a cumulative total of 518 hits across the top-75 firms. This does not mean 518 
individual articles since the count includes multiple hits where single articles include more than 
one listed firm. Only the 37 firms which returned 2 or more hits, accounting for 505 of the 518 
total, are listed here. We should note that the database, although providing global coverage of 
business and management journals is dominated by English-language, US-based publications. 
This is, however, simply a reflection of the research field and the proportion of US academics and 
academic institutions in the field.  